Some Remarks on the Recent SRM Related Case-Law of the CJEU with Special Regard to the Meroni Doctrine

György Marinkás

doi:10.47078/2024.2.185-209

Authors

György Marinkás Associate Professor, University of Miskolc, Faculty of Law https://orcid.org/0009-0008-1013-7306

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47078/2024.2.185-209

Keywords:

Meroni, delegation of power, Banking Union, Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution Mechanism, Banco Popular Group

Abstract

The study elaborates on the development of the Meroni doctrine, derived from the Meroni judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community under a different Founding Treaty framework and its applicability to the Banking Union under the current Treaty framework. To fulfil this aim, the author first elaborates on the Advocate General’s opinion and the Judgment of the Court of Justice in the Meroni case and then briefly introduces the evolution and the literature on the issue. After a short introduction of the Banking Union’s institutional order, the author introduces two cases in which issues related to the Meroni doctrine were raised before the General Court, as well as the appellate procedures before the Court of Justice in one of these cases.

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